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Abstract Philosophers and social scientists have recently turned to Lewis sender–
receiver games to provide an account of how lexical terms can acquire meaning
through an evolutionary process. However, the evolution of meaning is contingent on
both the particular sender–receiver game played and the choice of evolutionary
dynamic. In this paper I explore some differences between models that presume an
infinitely large and randomly mixed population and models in which a finite number
of agents communicate with their neighbors in a social network. My results show that
communication with neighbors is more conducive to the evolution of meaning than
communication with strangers. Additionally, I show that the behavior of the system
is highly dependent on the topological structure of the social network. I argue that a
specific class of networks—small world graphs—is especially conducive to the
evolution of meaning. This is because small world graphs have a short characteristic
path length while still maintaining a high degree of correlation between neighbors.
Since many actual social networks, such as friendship networks and nervous systems,
are conjectured to be small world structures, these results indicate that these net-
works are quite hospitable to the efficient evolution of meaning.
Keywords Evolution  Meaning  Dynamics  Game theory  Signaling 
Small world  Network  Graph  Communication  Correlation
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has become a useful tool for scholars attempting to
explain the emergence and persistence of social phenomena such as cooperation,
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fairness, and communication. It is common for this sort of model to presume an
infinitely large, well-mixed population of agents interacting at random. In fact, this
is an assumption of the replicator dynamic, which is one of the most frequently used
evolutionary rules in the philosophical literature. Many other influential models of
social behavior rely on a dynamical framework known as either Herrnstein or Roth
and Erev Reinforcement Learning. Although reinforcement learning does not
directly assume an infinite population, it has been proved that its long-run behavior
approximates that of the replicator dynamic (Beggs 2005).
Unfortunately, these results do not always transfer to models using other
plausible evolutionary rules. Indeed, it is sometimes the case that results obtained in
large population models do not apply to arguably more realistic models in which
agents are embedded in a network and only interact with their neighbors. For
example, defection in the prisoner’s dilemma always takes over the entire
population under the replicator dynamic, but cooperation can persist when played
on a network (Pollock 1989; Nowak and May 1992). Cooperation in the stag hunt is
also more prevalent when the players are embedded in a network. Skyrms (2004)
has found that over 99% of spatial stag hunts ended in stag hunting compared to far
fewer with the replicator dynamic. Alexander and Skyrms (1999) have likewise
shown that although fair division in the Nash bargaining game arises in a mere 60%
of trials using the replicator dynamic, it is the virtually unique solution when the
game is played with neighbors on a lattice. Similarly, Zollman (2005) has
demonstrated that the behavior of agents playing a sender–receiver game with their
neighbors on a lattice differs substantially from large population models of the same
game. Under the replicator dynamic the entire population converges to the same
strategy, but on a lattice many stable regions of agents adopt their own
communication conventions.
In many ways this paper continues Zollman’s (2005) analysis of the evolution of
communication on a lattice. I expand on his work by investigating variations of the
standard sender–receiver game that do not always converge to perfect communi-
cation in replicator dynamic models. As will be shown, interaction with neighbors in
a social network is more conducive to the emergence of perfect communication than
the replicator dynamic. I also consider a wide class of network topologies. It turns
out that the behavior of the system is highly contingent upon the structure of the
network. Even slight modifications to the connections in a two dimensional lattice
can cause large changes in the population’s collective behavior. In particular, if a
small number of edges are rewired, then regions of agents playing certain
undesirable strategies can persist on the network. Random rewiring of edges can
also drastically affect the number of regions that form.
2 Sender–Receiver Games
Sender–receiver games were originally introduced by David Lewis in Convention
(1969) to explain how linguistic terms can acquire meaning through nothing but the
coordination of speakers and hearers. The framework for sender–receiver games is
remarkably simple. The most austere variety consists of two players, two states,
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called s1 and s2, two messages, called m1 and m2, and two actions, called a1 and a2.
Before play begins, the state of the world is chosen at random by nature. The first
player, called the sender, observes the state that nature chose and sends one of the
two messages to the second player, called the receiver. The receiver, who is ignorant
of the state, observes the message and then chooses an action. Each action is the
correct response to exactly one of the states. If the receiver performs the correct
action for the state of the world that obtained, then both players receive a payoff of
1. Otherwise, both players receive no payoff.
For this sort of game, a pure strategy for the sender is a function that maps each
state to a message. Similarly, a strategy for the receiver is a function that maps each
message to an action. In this two state, two message, two act game, there are six
strategy profiles that constitute pure Nash equilibria. Two of these profiles are
perfectly communicative. If the players adopt one of these two profiles, then they
are guaranteed to receive a positive payoff regardless of the state that obtains. These
two equilibria are called signaling systems. The other four Nash equilibria are less
desirable. These babbling equilibria convey no information. A babbling equilibrium
is one in which the sender always sends the same message regardless of the state and
the receiver always performs the same action regardless of the message. Agents
playing a babbling equilibrium perform no better than chance.
In Convention, Lewis implied that the messages in a sender–receiver game gain
meaning when the players adopt a signaling system strategy. Therefore, if we can
explain how the use of signaling system strategies can emerge and persist in an
evolutionary setting, we can explain how messages can acquire meaning. To be
sure, this framework is quite simple—perhaps too simple to apply to human
communication. Nevertheless it is appropriate for modeling less complex commu-
nication systems, such as those employed by social bacteria, neurons, or non-human
animals. Domestic chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus), for instance, identify aerial
and terrestrial predators with two distinct alarm calls (Searcy and Nowicki 2005).
There is a correct response to each type of predator. The optimal response to an
aerial predator is to run for cover while crouching, but the optimal response to a
terrestrial predator is to stand tall and scan the horizontal plane. This interaction
between chicken senders and receivers mirrors the form of a Lewis sender–receiver
game.
Much is known about the evolution of populations playing this sort of two state
game in which the states are equiprobable. Skyrms (1996) has shown that under the
replicator dynamic, which is meant to simulate a large, well-mixed population of
players that interact in pairs chosen at random, the population always converges to a
signaling system equilibrium. Huttegger (2007) has recently proved this result
analytically. Additionally, Zollman (2005) has shown that agents playing this game
on a grid lattice and updating their strategies by imitating their best neighbor will
always converge to regional signaling systems. Each agent adopts a signaling
system strategy, but the entire lattice does not necessarily adopt the same strategy.
In Zollman’s setup agents within each stable region perfectly communicate with
each other, but they completely miscommunicate with agents inhabiting another
region using a different signaling system.
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However, it has only lately become known that such nice results do not
necessarily hold for even slight modifications of this very simple game. Huttegger
(2007) has proven that if the states are not equiprobable, then there is a chance that
the population will converge to a non-communicative babbling equilibrium. Using
computer simulations, I found approximately 41% of runs using the discrete-time
replicator dynamic ended with the population playing a babbling equilibrium when
p(s1) = .9 and p(s2) = .1.
Additionally, another sort of Nash equilibrium exists in sender–receiver games
with n states, n messages, and n actions when n [ 2. This type of equilibrium, called
partial pooling, conveys some information about the state, but is not perfectly
communicative like a signaling system. Huttegger (2007) proved that if n [ 2, then
a population evolving according to the replicator dynamics has a chance to converge
to a partial pooling equilibrium. Using computer simulations of the discrete time
replicator dynamic, it has been estimated that approximately 4.7% of initial
populations converge to partial pooling (Huttegger et al. 2009).
3 Communication About More Than Two States
3.1 Simulation Results
Since network interaction aids the emergence of fair bargaining and cooperation, a
natural question to ask is whether interaction with neighbors also aids the evolution
of perfect communication under these unfavorable circumstances (non-equiprobable
states and more than two states). The short answer is yes. Interaction with neighbors
increases the likelihood of perfect communication. But the full story is rather subtle.
Following Alexander and Skyrms (1999) and Zollman (2005) the first model I
consider will be 10,000 agents arranged on a 100 by 100 two dimensional lattice
mapped to a torus. Each agent’s neighbors are given by the Moore-8 neighborhood
(an agent’s neighbors are those vertices directly to her NW, N, NE, E, SE, S, SW,
W), although the qualitative behavior of this system is identical to the case in which
the agents only interact with their four von Neumann neighbors (N, E, S, W). Before
play begins each agent is randomly assigned both a sending strategy and a receiving
strategy. An iteration of the dynamic consists of two steps. First, each agent plays
with each of her neighbors twice—once as sender and once as receiver. Summing
the payoffs from these 16 encounters and then dividing this sum by the number of
games played gives the agent’s average payoff for the round. Each agent observes
the average payoff of each of her neighbors and then adopts both the sending and
receiving strategies of her most successful neighbor, so long as her most successful
neighbor received a higher payoff than herself. Otherwise the agent does not switch
strategies. Ties are broken by coin flips. This evolutionary rule is known as the
imitate-the-best dynamic.
Consider the case in which there are more than two possible states of nature.
Recall that with the replicator dynamic 4.7% of trials fell into partial pooling
equilibria when there were three possible states. For the network interaction model
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described above, all simulations (out of ten thousand total) converged to regional
signaling systems. Inefficient partial pooling strategies were driven to extinction.
The impact of network interaction is even more pronounced as the number of
states increases. When there are four states, approximately 24% of trials converge to
a signaling system using the replicator dynamics. However, 200 out of 200 trials of
1,000,000 agents arranged on a 1,000 by 1,000 two dimensional lattice converged to
regional signaling systems. For an n state sender–receiver game, there are n2n
possible strategy profiles, but only n! of these profiles are signaling systems. So, in
the random starting configuration of the network, each agent will be using a
signaling strategy with probability n!n2n : Therefore, the number of agents on the
network must grow exponentially in n for it to be even modestly likely that some
agent will begin the simulation by playing a signaling system strategy. However,
these simulation results indicate that for any n, the lattice can be made sufficiently
large so that the system is virtually guaranteed to converge to regional signaling
systems. Although, as is true of any theoretical system with exponential growth,
such a lattice will be unrealistically large for even moderately sized n. For example,
with n = 10, a 107 by 107 lattice is expected only to contain about 3.6 agents using
signaling system strategies.
3.2 Analysis
All observed simulations of the three state, three message, three act sender–receiver
game played on the Moore-8 toroidal lattice ended with partial pooling strategies
driven to extinction. But is it ever possible for a region of agents playing partial
pooling strategies to stably coexist with signaling systems on the network? Since an
agent on the interior of a region can only imitate its own strategy, the key to a
region’s stability is interaction along its frontiers. A partial pooling region will be
stable just in case each partial pooler on the frontier imitates an interior partial
pooler instead of a frontier signaling system. As shown in Fig. 1, there are three
relevant shapes that a frontier between regions can take. In order to investigate the
potential stability of partial pooling it is necessary to consider the stability of each
frontier structures in turn.
In the first case a frontier partial pooler is adjacent to three fellow partial poolers
and five signalers. At least one of these partial poolers is on the interior of the region
and interacts solely with other partial poolers to earn an average payoff of 2
3
: The
frontier partial pooler is also adjacent to a frontier signaler that interacts with seven
Fig. 1 The three relevant shapes that the border between two regions can take. Agents using a signaling
system strategy are denoted with the letter S. Agents using a partial pooling strategy are denoted with the
letter P
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other signaling systems and only a single partial pooler. Suppose this signaling
system completely miscommunicates with the partial pooling strategy (Fig. 2).
Then the frontier signaler earns nothing when interacting with a partial pooler, but
earns the maximum payoff of one when either sending to or receiving from another
signaler. This gives the frontier signaler an average payoff of 7
8
which is greater than
the 2
3
that an interior partial pooler earns. Consequently the frontier partial pooler
will imitate the frontier signaler and the region of partial pooling will not be stable.
In the second case a frontier partial pooler is adjacent to five fellow partial
poolers and three signalers. The region is stable if an interior partial pooler earns a
greater payoff than a frontier signaler. In this case each frontier signaler is adjacent
to three partial poolers and five other signalers, so each frontier signaler earns an
average payoff of 5
8
: This is less than the 2
3
earned by an interior partial pooler.
Therefore, the frontier partial pooler will imitate the interior partial pooler and the
region will be stable.
In the third case a frontier partial pooler is adjacent to seven fellow partial
poolers and a single frontier signaler. This frontier signaler performs quite poorly
since she interacts with only three other signalers. She earns an average payoff of 3
8
which is less than the 2
3
earned by an interior partial pooler. Thus the frontier partial
pooler will imitate an interior partial pooler and the corner between regions will be
stable.
Notice, however, that the stability of the frontier in case two, and hence the
persistence of partial pooling on the lattice, relies on total miscommunication
between agents in the two regions. For example, suppose that some information is
exchanged between the boundary agents. If an agent playing a signaling system
strategy and an agent playing a partial pooling strategy communicate correctly
about just one of the three states, then the frontier signaler’s payoff becomes 6
8
: This
payoff is greater than the 2
3
that the interior partial pooler earns, so the partial pooler
on the frontier will imitate the frontier signaling system. This imitation destabilizes
the region of partial poolers. So regions of partial pooling strategies can persist on
the network provided that they only share borders with the signaling system that
they completely miscommunicate with.
This analysis shows that partial pooling can coexist stably with signaling systems
on a network only if two rather unlikely conditions are fulfilled. No partial pooler
can be adjacent to a signaling system with which it partially communicates. And the
region of partial poolers cannot include a corner surrounded by signaling systems on
five out of eight sides. The second condition can be satisfied if the region of partial
poolers either occupies a slice of the toroidal lattice or entirely surrounds a
rectangular region of signalers. Although a theoretic possibility, the likelihood of
Fig. 2 A signaling system and a partial pooling equilibrium that exchange no information
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these two conditions being simultaneously fulfilled for a region of partial poolers is
quite small. This explains the fact that partial pooling equilibria are never seen in
simulations executed on a sufficiently large lattice.
4 Communication When Nature is Biased
4.1 Simulation Results
The situation is more complicated for two-state sender–receiver games in which
nature flips a biased coin to determine the state. As Fig. 3 shows, as p(s1) increases
from .55 to .95, the number of discrete-time replicator dynamic simulations that
don’t converge to signaling systems grows in a uniform manner. On the other hand,
all observed imitate-the-best simulations on a 100 9 100 Moore-8 toroidal lattice
converged to regional signaling systems unless p(s1) C .9. When p(s1) = .95, 156
out of 300 simulations ended in a stable state in which a region of agents using a
babbling strategy was surrounded by a region of agents using a signaling system.
But, these babbling regions were always small. Of the 156 trials that ended with
babblers, an average of 99.311% of agents were using signaling system strategies.
Similarly, when p(s1) = .9, 123 of 300 simulations ended in a stable state in
which not all agents had adopted signaling system strategies, but here the non-
signaling system being played was not a babbling equilibrium. Instead it was a non-
Nash equilibrium strategy of the form shown in Fig. 4. This half babbling strategy
sends the same message regardless of the state, but discriminates between messages
Fig. 3 Proportion of simulations that did not converge to signaling systems under the replicator and
imitate-the-best dynamics. Imitate-the-best simulations were performed on a 100 9 100 Moore-8 toroidal
lattice
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when choosing an action. The regions of half babblers seen in simulations always
perfectly miscommunicate when receiving messages from the surrounding signaling
systems. That is, they earn absolutely no payoff when receiving a message from an
adjacent signaling system. It is, perhaps, surprising to see the emergence of non-
Nash play in the sender–receiver game. The replicator dynamics, for example, never
converge to half babbling strategies because they are not Nash equilibria of the
sender–receiver game. But it has been shown that the imitate-the-best dynamic can
lead to cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma persisting on the Moore-8 lattice
(Nowak and May 1992), so this is not the sole instance of imitate-the-best leading to
non-Nash equilibrium behavior.
These simulation results suggest that the interaction environment of the Moore-8
toroidal lattice is more hospitable to the emergence of perfect communication than
the well-mixed environment presumed by the replicator dynamic in two ways. First,
unless the disparity between p(s1) and p(s2) is quite large, babbling equilibria and
half babbling strategies are driven to extinction on the lattice. Second, even when
non-signaling system strategies persist on the lattice, they are only seen in small
regions. The lattice overwhelmingly adopts signaling systems, and only small
regions maintain inefficient communication strategies.
4.2 Analysis
The fact that non-signaling system strategies are never observed in simulations on a
lattice until the disparity between state probabilities becomes quite large indicates
that there may be a particular threshold of p(s1) such that babbling and half babbling
strategies are unstable below the threshold but become stable above. This is indeed
the case. Just like in the analysis of the three state sender receiver game, interaction
along the frontiers between regions determines the stability of the regions. The three
relevant frontier structures to consider are the same as in Fig. 1, except here the role
of partial pooling is played by a half babbling strategy.
Suppose that p(s1) = a and p(s2) = 1 - a. Let the signaling system and half
babbling strategies shown in Fig. 4 be the particular ones played. Then a frontier
signaler will earn 1 when sending to or receiving from another signaler, 0 when
sending to a half babbler, and 1 - a when receiving from a half babbler. An interior
half babbler interacts only with fellow half babblers and hence receives an average
payoff of a. In the first case (as shown in Fig. 1), the frontier signaler interacts with
seven signalers and one half babbler to earn an average payoff of 15a
16
:
Consequently, the frontier half babbler will imitate the interior half babbler only
if a[ 15
17
 :8824: This explains why stable rectangles of half babblers were seen in
simulations when p(s1) = .9.
Fig. 4 A signaling system and the babbling and half babbling strategies that miscommunicate with it
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In the second case, a frontier half babbler is adjacent to five fellow half babblers
and three signaling systems. Each frontier signaler interacts with five other signaling
systems and three half babblers to earn an average payoff of 133a
16
: Therefore, the
frontier half babbler will imitate an interior babbler instead of a frontier signaler just
in case a[ 13
19
 :6842:
In the third case, a frontier half babbler is adjacent to seven fellow half babblers
and a single signaler. This frontier signaler interacts with three signalers and five
half babblers to earn an average payoff of 116a
16
: So this frontier half babbler in the
corner between regions will imitate an interior half babbler if a[ 1
2
: But this case is
rather redundant because a region that includes this sort of corner and is large
enough to contain an interior half babbler must also include a frontier in the shape of
case two. So for a convex region of half babblers with a case two shaped corner to
be stable, it must be the case that a[ 13
19
:
This analysis can be carried out in a similar fashion to determine the conditions
under which babbling equilibria become stable. A frontier signaler earns 1 - a
when receiving from a babbler and earns a when sending to a babbler. It turns out
that a case one corner of babblers is stable if a[ 15
16
: A case two edge is stable if
a[ 13
16
: And a region of babblers with a case three corner is also stable if a[ 13
16
:
Now it is possible to completely characterize the conditions under which regions
playing non-signaling system strategies can be stable on the Moore-8 lattice. When
pðs1Þ[ 1319  :6842; regions of half babblers that do not include a case one style
corner become stable. This sort of region is either an entire slice of the toroidal
lattice or completely surrounds a rectangular region of signalers. No stable regions
of this sort were ever seen in simulations. When pðs1Þ[ 1316 ¼ :8125; regions of the
same shape populated by babblers becomes stable. This type of region was also
never seen in simulations. When pðs1Þ[ 1517  :8824; regions of half babblers that
include a case one corner become stable. Regions of this sort were often seen in
simulations when p(s1) = .9. When pðs1Þ[ 1516 ¼ :9375; the same type of region
populated by babblers becomes stable. This sort of region was often seen in
simulations when p(s2) = .95.
It is worth noting that this sort of analysis can be extended beyond models of
agents arranged on a lattice playing with their Moore-8 neighbors. It can be applied
to any sort of graph structure in which each agent has the same number of
neighbors. For example, on a lattice with the von Neumann neighborhood (4
neighbors), babbling becomes stable when pðs1Þ[ 78 : But, as the following pair of
theorems illustrates, not all graph structures provide such a favorable environment
for the emergence of perfect communication.
Theorem 1 If agents that update their strategies according to the imitate-the-best
dynamic play a sender–receiver game with their neighbors on a regular graph of
degree k, then regions of agents using babbling equilibria can be stable only if
either pðs1Þ[ kþ12k or pðs2Þ[ kþ12k :
Proof Without loss of generality, suppose p(s1) [ p(s2). Let p(s1) = a and
p(s2) = 1 - a. For a region of babblers to be resistant to invasion by signaling
systems, each frontier babbler must imitate an interior babbler instead of a frontier
signaler. This requires that interior babblers perform better than each frontier
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signaler. An interior babbler earns an average payoff of a in each round. A frontier
signaler performs worst when adjacent to k - 1 babblers and a single other signaler.
In this case the frontier signaler earns an average payoff of a when sending to a
babbler, 1 - a when receiving from a babbler, and 1 when either sending or
receiving from a signaler. This gives an average payoff of
aðk1Þþð1aÞðk1Þþ2
2k ¼ kþ12k :
Therefore regions of babbling can stably coexist with regions of signaling only if
either pðs1Þ[ kþ12k or pðs2Þ[ kþ12k : h
This theorem shows that there are some regular graph structures on which a
region of babblers can be stable even if nature is only slightly biased. Furthermore,
as the degree of the graph increases, and hence the number of interactions each
agent participates in increases, the disparity between p(s1) and p(s2) required for the
stability of babbling decreases. But the good news here for the emergence perfect
communication is that, regardless of the network structure, babbling regions are
never stable when the states are equiprobable. However, as the next theorem shows,
this pleasant result does not hold for regions of half babblers.
Theorem 2 When the states of nature are equiprobable, regions of half babbling
agents can be stable on some regular graphs of degree k when k [ 3.
Proof Suppose the states of nature are equiprobable so that p(s1) = p(s2) = .5.
Then an interior half babbler will communicate only with other half babblers to earn
an average payoff of .5. A frontier signaler earns 0 with sending to a half babbler, .5
when receiving from a half babbler, and 1 when either sending to or receiving from
a signaler. In the worst case for the frontier signaler, she may be adjacent to k - 1
half babblers and only a single other signaler. In this case she earns an average
payoff of
2þ:5ðk1Þ
2k : The region of half babblers will be stable only if each frontier
half babbler imitates the interior babbler instead of a frontier signaler. This will
occur if :5 [ 2þ:5ðk1Þ
2k : Therefore the region will be stable if k [ 3. h
So not only can some regular graphs sustain babbling agents when nature is only
slightly biased, but some regular graphs, such as the one shown in Fig. 5, can
sustain half babbling agents even when the states are equiprobable. Graph structures
that are extremely inhospitable towards signalers, like the one in Fig. 5 or the ones
invoked in the proofs of the above theorems, all have the peculiar property that
agents on the frontier of a region of signalers are perfectly anti-correlated. That is,
agents on the frontier of the signaling region never interact with each other. Instead
of interacting with each other, these agents are fated to interact with many
uncommunicative babblers or half babblers. In contrast to this situation, agents on
the frontiers of regions on the Moore-8 lattice often interact with each other. And,
not so coincidentally, the Moore-8 lattice provides a favorable environment for the
emergence of perfect communication.
The observation that correlation of encounters between agents along the frontiers
aids the emergence of perfect communication can be seen as an instance of the more
general moral from game theoretic analysis that positive correlation of encounters
between agents playing the same strategy increases the likelihood of cooperation
and coordination. This lesson was perhaps first pointed out by Hamilton (1971) who
observed that cooperation can emerge and persist in a population playing a
386 E. Wagner
123
prisoner’s dilemma provided that encounters are non-random in such a way as to
make individuals more likely to pair with others who use the same strategy. In the
prisoner’s dilemma this non-random assortment of strategy types causes the
expected fitness of cooperators to increase and the fitness of defectors to decrease.
Although the game being played here is not the prisoner’s dilemma, the graph
structure imposed by agents interacting with their Moore-8 lattice neighbors
generates just this sort of positive correlation along the frontiers between regions.
The Moore-8 lattice structure guarantees that a signaler on the boundary between a
region of signalers and a region of babblers plays at least six of her sixteen games
with other signalers.
This correlation of strategy types along the frontiers is caused by correlation
between neighbors. A signaler on the frontier must be adjacent to an interior
signaler. Each agent adjacent to this interior signaler must also be a signaler.
Consequently, since on the Moore-8 lattice the frontier signaler and the interior
signaler share at least four of the same neighbors, the frontier signaler will often be
found interacting with other signalers. On the Moore-8 lattice the neighbors of any
particular agent are often neighbors of each other, and this correlation between
neighbors causes a corresponding correlation of strategy types along the frontiers
between regions.
On the other hand, in an arbitrary graph a signaler on the frontier between a
group of signalers and a group of babblers may be adjacent to only a single other
signaler. If this is the case, then the frontier signaler will always imitate the interior
signaler despite the fact that the frontier signaler will herself perform poorly
because she may be adjacent to many uncommunicative babblers. And because the
frontier signaler performs so poorly, her uncommunicative neighbors will have less
incentive to imitate her perfectly communicative signaling system strategy.
Lack of correlation between neighbors in a social network means that there is less
positive correlation between agents playing signaling systems on the frontiers. This
lack of correlation between frontier signalers depresses the value of p(s1) for which
babbling and half babbling can stabilize. Graph structures that impose a high degree
Fig. 5 A regular graph of
degree 4 inhabited by a region of
half babblers and a region of
signalers. These regions are
stable even when
p(s1) = p(s2) = .5. Agents
using half babbling strategies are
represented by the letter H.
Signalers are represented by the
letter S
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of correlation between neighbors will therefore be more conducive to the emergence
of signaling systems than graph structures that only weakly correlate neighbors.
5 Communication in Small Worlds
Correlation between neighbors is the feature of network structure that is responsible
for destabilizing regions of inefficient communication. However, different graph
topologies provide different amounts of correlation. A natural next step in this
investigation is to systematically analyze how slight alterations of the graph
topology, and hence small changes to the correlation between neighbors, impacts
the emergence and stability of signaling systems. But before this can be done it is
necessary to chose both a method of measuring correlation between neighbors and a
method of generating graphs that exhibit a controlled amount of correlation.
A graph’s clustering coefficient is one way to measure correlation between
neighbors in a network. The clustering coefficient cv of a vertex v in a graph is the
fraction of possible edges in the neighborhood of v that actually occur in the
neighborhood of v. More precisely, cv ¼ jEðCvÞj=ð kv2 Þ where |E(Cv)| is the number of
edges in the neighborhood of v and kv is the number of vertices adjacent to v. So cv
measures the probability that vertices adjacent to v are also adjacent to each other. The
clustering coefficient c of an entire graph is cv averaged over all vertices in the graph.
Another useful metric for studying graph structures is characteristic path length,
denoted L. Following Watts (1999) I’ll define L as the median of the means of the
shortest path lengths connecting each vertex in the graph to all other vertices.
Finding L for a large graph is quite computationally intensive. So, again following
Watts (1999) in this paper I’ll use a technique due to Huber (1996) that chooses an
appropriately sized random sample of vertices to compute L within an acceptable
margin of error.
Both these metrics have proven useful to mathematicians and sociologists
investigating so-called small-world graphs. If a graph represents a social network in
which edges connect acquaintances, then the clustering coefficient measures the
degree to which a person’s acquaintances are acquainted with each other. And in
this interpretation the characteristic path length of a graph approximates the average
number of acquaintances that separate any two individuals of the social network.
Small-world graphs are those graphs that have a large clustering coefficient and a
short characteristic path length. It is conjectured that many real-world interaction
networks are small-world graphs. Popular examples include the Internet Movie
Database (the Kevin Bacon Game) and co-authorship networks (Erdo¨s numbers).
Also Watts and Strogatz (1998) have shown that the neural connections of the worm
C. elegans exhibit small-world properties, and it is believed that the same goes for
many other neural systems.
To study small-world phenomena, Watts introduced a parameterized family of
graphs called b-graphs. A b-graph is generated by starting with a ring in which each
vertex is connected to its k nearest neighbors. Then, for every vertex v, each of the k
2
leftmost edges is rewired to a random vertex u with probability b. The vertex u is
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chosen uniformly at random from the whole graph omitting redundant connections
and self-loops. For low values of b, b-graphs are highly structured, but as b
increases, the resulting graphs become more and more random. Watts studied b-
graphs because there is a range of b values for which the resulting graphs are highly
clustered and yet have short characteristic path lengths. That is, some b-graphs
exhibit small-world properties, as shown by Fig. 6.
Since b-graphs transition from highly structured (much correlation between
neighbors) to completely random (very little correlation between neighbors) they
provide an excellent way to systematically study how the amount of correlation
between neighbors impacts the emergence of communication in sender–receiver
games. On a ring in which each vertex is connected to its 8 nearest neighbors, half
babbling becomes stable when pðs1Þ[ 1517 : Thus, if a sender–receiver game with
p(s1) = .88 and p(s2) = .12 is played by 10,000 agents on a b-graph with k = 8, all
agents will adopt signaling system strategies when b = 0. As b increases, however,
the graph becomes less structured. Therefore, as the analysis in the last section
suggests, half babbling should become stable and not all simulations will converge
to perfect communication. Furthermore, if it is truly correlation between neighbors
that is responsible for destabilizing non-signaling system regions, then the
proportion of agents on the network playing signaling systems should follow the
clustering coefficient of the graph as b ranges from 0 to 1. This is indeed what is
seen in simulations. As Fig. 7 shows, the proportion of agents playing signaling
systems closely follows c as b increases.
One might wonder if something about this result is particular to starting with a
ring in which every vertex is connected to its k nearest neighbors. After all, I began
this paper by pointing out that all too often evolutionary game theory results are
dependent on a specific interaction dynamic or on a specific graph topology. For






































Fig. 6 L and c vs. b for b-graphs with 3,000 vertices and average degree 8. Each data point is an average
of 20 realizations of the b-graph construction algorithm
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dominated by the properties of the ring. So, one might also consider performing the
b-graph random rewiring process on the most frequently looked at topology: a two
dimensional toroidal lattice with edges given by the Moore-8 neighborhood.
Remember that non-signaling system strategies were only seen on the Moore-8
lattice when p(s1) C .9. Hence, for sender–receiver games with p(s1) = .88 and
p(s2) = .12, when b = 0, the entire network should adopt signaling system
strategies. As b increases, however, regions of babbling and half babbling should
become stable. Just like on the ring, this is actually what is seen in simulations
(Fig. 8). As b increases, the proportion of agents playing perfectly communicative
signaling systems very closely follows the clustering coefficient of the graph. These
results strongly indicate that it is indeed correlation between neighbors that aids the
emergence of communication when the states are not equiprobable.
As mentioned earlier, one of the most surprising results from Zollman (2005) is
that when sender–receiver games are played on a two dimensional toroidal lattice,
multiple stable regions of communication emerge. Within each region all agents
play the same signaling system. But, at least in the two state sender–receiver game,
agents from a region playing one signaling system utterly miscommunicate with
agents from another region playing a different signaling system. So there is
complete communication within regions, but no communication between regions. In
general, this result holds as network topology is altered. However, different
structures with the same number of vertices can lead to remarkably different
numbers of regions evolving. For example, out of 1,000 simulations on a Moore-8
toroidal lattice with 10,000 agents playing the two state sender–receiver game with
equiprobable states, an average of 9 stable regions existed when the evolution
stabilized. But, on a 10,000 node cycle, an average of 462 stable regions were












































Fraction using signaling systems
Fig. 7 c and fraction of agents using signaling system strategies vs. b for b-graphs with 10,000 vertices




same signaling system on each of 1,000 out of 1,000 simulations. These results
clearly show that in addition to the network topology influencing the likelihood of
arriving at perfect communication, it can also drastically affect the number of
regions that exist when the evolution stabilizes.
It turns out that the characteristic path length of the graph controls the number of
stable regions that emerge. As b increases, the number of stable regions closely
follows L (Fig. 9). Remember that the characteristic path length is a measure of the
average distance between agents on the graph. So, if L is short, like in the wheel or
the Moore-8 toroidal lattice, then the first signaling system to establish itself will
rapidly spread and take over the entire network. However, if L is long, like in the
ring, it can take many steps of the imitate-the-best dynamic for the signaling system
strategy to spread. During this time, other clusters of different signaling systems are
likely to form.
So, the clustering coefficient of the graph influences the likelihood that agents
will play signaling system strategies when the evolution stabilizes. And the
characteristic path length of the graph influences the number of stable regions of
agents all playing the same strategy. An interesting ramification of these two
observations is that there exists a class of graphs in which very few regions emerge
and that these regions are all perfectly communicative—even when the states are
not equiprobable. This is the class of graphs that are highly clustered and have short
characteristic path lengths. Namely, the class of small-world graphs. It turns out that
small-worlds, like our own social networks and the organization of neural systems,
are very conducive to highly efficient communication. Networks with longer
characteristic path lengths have more regions, and hence more miscommunication
between agents on the borders. Networks with less clustering are more prone to
















































Fraction using signaling systems
Fig. 8 c and fraction of agents using signaling system strategies vs. b for Moore-8 toroidal lattices with
edges rewired using the b-graph randomization process. Each graph has 10,000 vertices. p(s1) = .88 and
p(s2) = .12. Each point is an average of 20 realizations of the b-graph rewiring algorithm
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in the small-world graphs that both babblers are eliminated and that the number of
regions is minimized.
6 Conclusion
Throughout this paper I have investigated the behavior of agents playing a simple
communication game with their neighbors in a social network. Not only do the
results in this sort of model differ greatly from those obtained through models that
presume an infinitely large, well-mixed population, but the results can also differ
greatly depending on the particular network topology that the agents inhabit.
Furthermore, slight changes in structure can cause large changes in collective
behavior. Witness the number of stable signaling system regions on b-graphs, for
example (Fig. 9). With a .2% chance of randomly rewiring each edge, an average of
22.1 regions formed. By increasing the chance of rewiring to only 3%, the average
number of regions decreased to 2.55.
I have also identified one type of correlation present in models of networked
interaction that is not present in random interaction models. Namely, correlation
between neighbors. It is this type of correlation that is responsible for destabilizing
otherwise stable regions of inefficient communication. This is the form of
correlation that makes interaction through social networks a more hospitable
environment for the emergence of perfect communication in sender–receiver games
when nature is biased than, say, the well-mixed environment of a test tube. Due to
high correlation between neighbors and short characteristic path length, one family














































Number of stable regions
Fig. 9 L and number of stable regions observed when the evolutionary dynamic stabilized vs. b for b-
graphs with 3,000 vertices of average degree 8. p(s1) = p(s2) = .5. Each point is an average of 20
realizations of the b-graph construction algorithm
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signaling. Fortunately for aspiring communicators, many real-life social interactions
are conjectured to take place through small world network structures.
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